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In Sweden, reforms enacted in the early 1990s allowed
new schools to be set up that are independent of
government control. A variety of educational providers
stepped in, ranging from non-profit co-operatives and
faith groups to for-profit corporations. These organisations
are now running schools funded with public money
through a voucher system.
The Swedish system has been strongly praised by
Conservative politicians, whose ‘Advancing Opportunity’
agenda proposes ‘freeing up the system whereby new
schools are established, to allow charities, livery
companies, existing school federations, not-for-profit
trusts, co-operatives and groups of parents to set up new
schools in the state sector’. It has been suggested that an
extended and reformed academies programme (initially
introduced by the Blair government) would be the way to
implement this approach in the UK.
For some years, school choice and competition have been
advocated as a mechanism for improving educational
standards. It is argued that schools in the public sector
might lack the right incentives to provide the best possible
education, and the idea is that competition should put
pressure on these schools to improve. But the evidence on
this is mixed, and the most detailed
study for England, carried out at CEP,
finds no effect of choice and
competition on primary school
performance (Gibbons et al, 2008).
There have been a number of studies of
the effects of the Swedish reform. The
most recent and careful study is by
Anders Bohlmark and Mikael Lindahl
(2008), who find evidence of only small
positive effects. They speculate that one reason
for this could be the fact that the entry of new
private schools has not been followed by the closing
down of state schools. It may be that increasing shares
of school budgets have been devoted to the maintenance
of poor quality state schools.
This points to a general weakness in the application of
market economics to the public sector. There is no natural
mechanism for closing down poor schools (they do not
literally go bust). Closing down schools can be slow,
political and unpopular. The reality that governments will
have to support simultaneously the new schools and the
older ‘bad’ ones, and that the latter will not exit at an
efficient rate, needs to be factored into the expected cost-
effectiveness of a ‘school creation’ policy.
Creating new schools can also be an expensive 
policy if large capital outlays are required. This is the 
case with academies in the UK, although not for the 
new independent schools in Sweden. The latter are 
usually small and often use empty office buildings or
former schools. This raises several big questions for all
political parties.
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In a climate of tight public expenditure, is capital spending
really the most efficient use of funds? What about all the
evidence on other things that work to improve
educational performance, such as teacher quality, reducing
class size, etc? And what about recent research that
evaluates the academies programme? Stephen Machin
and Joan Wilson (2009) find evidence that new 
academies have not performed very much better than
other similar schools.
Of course, not everything is about money. The main
reason why the Swedish model is praised is because 
the schools are free from political control. But this is only
true up to a point. For example, the new Swedish schools
have to follow the national curriculum. This is not the case
for academy schools in the UK, where it is only a
requirement for English, maths, science and information
and communications technology. The sponsor also
chooses the subject specialism (since all academy schools
are ‘specialist’).
Although, as in Sweden, state schools are not allowed to
select pupils by ability, specialist schools are allowed to
select 10% of pupils by ‘aptitude’ in their specialist
subject. In practical terms, how does a school select by
aptitude and not by ability? Is it right that sponsors should
have so much power in deciding how pupils are taught?
How can other aspects of policy be imposed (synthetic
phonics, for example) while allowing independence from
political control?
It is not at all clear in principle or practice how far the
provision of education can or should be independent from
the political process. This is partly a question of empirical
research. If ‘autonomy’ is shown to be a good feature of
aspects of school governance, then why not extend this
privilege to all schools? This is not an argument for brand
new schools.
Furthermore, importing the Swedish model may not make
very much difference to the UK’s educational status quo.
In the early 1990s, Sweden started from a position of no
school choice: all pupils had to attend the state school in
their neighbourhood. In the UK, however, there is already
much school choice and a diversity of provision. 
The problem – as research at CEP has shown - is that not
all people in the UK are empowered to exercise choice
because they do not have the money to move to an area
with popular schools or the personal resources to access
and understand information about school quality. Therein
lies another challenge.
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